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ABSTRAK
Apakah menggiatnya aktivisme politik masyarakat sipil berkorelasi positif terhadap
pendalaman demokrasi di Indonesia? Artikel ini berusaha menjawab pertanyaan tersebut dengan mengkaji peranan masyarakat sipil dalam Pemilu Presiden 2014, dengan
fokus aktivisme gerakan relawan yang mempengaruhi proses maupun hasil pemilu.
Meskipun beberapa studi terkait aktivisme masyarakat sipil dalam pemilihan presiden
2014 menyarankan adanya hubungan antara peran gerakan relawan dengan proses
demokrasi di Indonesia, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa asumsi (dan glorifikasi) terhadap gerakan relawan dan kaitannya dengan demokrasi perlu dipertimbangkan kembali.
Artikel ini berpendapat bahwa meskipun aktivisme gerakan relawan berkontribusi positif terhadap proses pemilu yang lebih demokratis, namun pemeriksaan lebih lanjut
terhadap aktivisme gerakan relawan justru mengonfirmasi adanya karakteristik yang
problematis serta keterbatasan gerakan relawan yang dapat menyebabkan keterputusan kaitan antara masyarakat sipil dan konsolidasi demokrasi di Indonesia.
Kata kunci: masyarakat madani, volunterisme, kelompok relawan, pemilihan presiden,
konsolidasi demokrasi
ABSTRACT
Is a flourishing civil society’s political activism positively correlated with the deepening
of Indonesian democracy? This article addresses this question by examining the role
of civil society in the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia, focusing on the collective
actions of volunteer groups (known as Gerakan Relawan) that shaped both the election
process and its result. While some studies on civil society activism in the 2014 presidential election suggested the connection between the role of volunteer movement and the
democratic process in Indonesia, this paper suggests that the overpraised assumptions
regarding the connection between civil society’s role and democratic consolidation,
in the case of volunteer movement, needs to be reconsidered. This paper argues that
although the activism of the volunteer movement has positively contributed to the
democratic process of the 2014 election, however, realistic assessment of the volunteer
movement confirms its problematic nature and the limits of volunteer activism that
may contribute to the disconnection of civil society and democratic consolidation in
the country.
Keywords: civil society, volunteerism, volunteers group, presidential election, democratic consolidation
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I N T RODUC T ION

Much of the debates on Indonesia’s presidential election in 2014
remarked the notion of civil society as an engine behind the growing
spirit of volunteerism, individual activism, public monitoring, and collective actions that shaped both the election process and its result. Due
to the vibrancy and voluntary activism of civil society during the 2014
presidential election, they were hailed as “celebrity of the election” and
even “savior of Indonesia’s democracy”. Following this success, observers
and pundits highlighted the notion of civil society’s resurgence, whose
power is beyond political parties in organizing and mobilizing popular support in the elections. Civil society has become critical element
that has succeeded in changing electoral politics in Indonesia. They
have manifested as a real political force vis-à-vis political parties and
money-driven campaigns. According to the literatures, many believe
that without the support of civil society, Joko Widodo (or Jokowi) would
not have been elected as Jakarta’s governor in 2012 and president-elect
in 2014 (Hurriyah 2018). Thus, the emergence of the so-called Gerakan
Relawan has marked a new feature of civil society’s political activism
in Indonesia’s electoral politics.
Most studies regarding the phenomenon of volunteerism in the 2014
residential election have suggested a connection between the role of
civil society (in the form of volunteers) and democratization in Indonesia (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015; Hasanuddin 2014; Suaedy 2014;
Ambyo 2014; Arianto 2014) on the basis of two reasons: first, these
volunteers –who worked individually and in groups, across all classes in
society, had various backgrounds – emerged as a progressive civil society
(Mietzner 2013) characterized by autonomous and voluntary organizations motivated by pro-democratic goals (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015)
with a high degree of political awareness (Samah and Susanti 2014).
Second, the role of volunteers is considered as a breakthrough for political change in Indonesia (Suaedy 2014) and is in line with civil society’s
democracy-building functions that deepen democracy in the country
(Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015; Hasanuddin 2014; Okamoto 2014) and
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
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help change the political values of patrimonial and oligarchic nuance
in Indonesian political tradition (Alam, et al. 2017).
While the idea of civil society as an agent for democratic consolidation has long been theoretical belief within the academic communities
(Putnam 1993, Gellner 1994, Fukuyama 1996, Diamond 1999, Porio
2002, Boussard 2003), a careful examination of whether this assumption
is flawed and immature is necessary. Notably, after reaching soaring
and unprecedented popularity in the last two decades, the concept of
civil society has become the object of considerable scrutiny, cynicism,
and even disdain for years (Berman 1997). Compared with the idea
of civil society as the remedy for the various ills afflicting advances
industrial democracies (Putnam 1993), a flurry of studies accuses them
of fostering the very ills they are meant to help cure: authoritarianism,
corruption, and lack of accountability, to name just a few (Encarnación
2006). Thus, the purpose of this article is to confirm the overpraised
assumption of civil society and the case of Indonesia’s 2014 presidential
election may underline this idea.
Contrary to the literatures, this article suggests that the overpraised
assumptions regarding the political activism of the volunteers and its
connection to the democratic deepening should be reconsidered. This
article attempts to answer whether a flourishing civil society’s political
activism correlated positively with the deepening of Indonesian democracy. By examining the role of the volunteer movement, this article aims
to contribute to the debate on the connection between the role of civil
society and democratic consolidation. This paper argues that although
the robust activism of the volunteers movement has contributed to the
democratic process and improved the quality of the 2014 election, their
role had little, if any, effect on democratic consolidation in Indonesia. This study shows that the problematic nature and agenda of the
volunteer groups have not limited their ability to perform democracybuilding functions and contributed to the disconnection of civil society
and democratic consolidation in the country.
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CI V I L SO CI E T Y R ECONSI DER ED

The idea of civil society as an agent of democratic consolidation has
long been a theoretical belief within the academic communities. Civil
society is often hailed as the engine for democratization: in bringing
about democratization, propelling democratic transition as well as consolidating democracy. Many scholars agree in describing civil society
as a social force within a society that contributes to the development of
democracy and serves as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation.
Civil society, as Diamond (1994, 3-17) suggested, can contribute to the
strengthening of democracy through its democratic-building functions,
in which civil society: (1) sets the limit on state power; (2) supplements
the role of political parties; (3) develops democratic attributes; (4) creates channels for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of
interest, and generates opportunities for participation and influence at
all levels of governance; (5) mitigates the principal polarities of political conflicts; (6) recruits and trains new political leaders; (7) monitors
elections; (8) disseminates information and aids citizens; (9) supports
economic reform; and (10) strengthens the democratic state.
As this paper attempts to avoid the glorification of civil society, carefully observing how the political context determines the nature of civil
society and its effect on democracy is critical. One of the often raised
questions is to what extent is a robust and vibrant civil society are beneficial to the development of democracy and, even more notable, to
a consolidated democracy? The nature of civil society is such that it
is a complex and heterogeneous entity that may compound organizations with undemocratic goals and uncivil manners. Civil society can
be good or evil or something else, and its various components may or
may not behave in a civil manner; additionally, it may or may not espouse democratic goals (Bermeo 2000; Hadiwinata 2005). Hence, the
glorification of the idea of civil society as a type of a panacea for the
developing world, would result in consequences such as flawed argument that would require reconsideration.
The most influential text criticizing the idea of the virtuous power
of civil society is Omar Encarnación’s The Myth of Civil Society, a study
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v4i2.167
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of civil society in the consolidation of Spain and Brazil’s democracy.
According to Encarnación, in contrast to the idea of a vibrant civil society as prerequisite for democratization, a flourishing civil society can
actually be a hindrance to democratization, particularly if surrounded
by weak and inefficient political institutions. Encarnación (2003, 5)
concludes that many of the new democracies during the third wave lack
most of the conditions usually attached to a vibrant and robust civil society. Similar to Encarnación’s emphasis on the political context of civil
society, Caroline Boussard’s Civil Society’s Role in the Post-Transition
Honduras is also useful. According to Boussard (2003), to understand
civil society’s complex relationship to democracy, three features must be
addressed: the political context, the external influence and the internal
structure of civil society organizations (CSOs).
In terms of political context, the role of civil society is strongly dependent on the state, particularly the strategies of the governing elite.
Without sufficient attention to the surrounding political structures, civil
society’s democracy-building potential cannot be understood. In terms
of external influence, the emergence of the so-called non-governmental
organization (NGO) development has been emphasizing the impact
of development assistance on civil society’s role in development and
democratization. Finally, the internal structure of civil society organizations is also crucial to understand how civil society may contribute to democratization. As Boussard (2003, 6) asserted, a civil society
compounds of organizations with undemocratic goals and methods,
and with internal authoritarian structures, is not likely to contribute to
democratic development by functioning as “schools for democracy”, as
suggested by Alexis de Tocqueville, however, it may still have a democracy-building function by being a countervailing power to the state .
CI V I L SO CI E T Y ’ S AC T I V ISM I N T H E
2014 PR ESI DEN T I A L E L EC T ION

For much of the country, the 2014 presidential election has become
a test for the longevity of Indonesian democracy, due to the formidable
contestation between two candidates depicted as the symbol of a demoPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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cratic leader versus the authoritarian elite. Mietzner (2014, 112) asserts
that the election was a threat to Indonesia’s democracy for two reasons:
first, the election highlighted the strength of the country’s antidemocratic forces -within the elite and the general electorate, and second,
the election was a contest not only between two candidates, but also
between diametrically opposed concepts of power and visions for Indonesia’s future: namely, between grassroots volunteerism versus oligarchy;
technocratic moderation versus populist demagoguery; and support for
democratic elections versus the denunciation of them as “un-Indonesian
and too costly”. To many prodemocracy activists, the election was the
culmination of their sustained efforts in mobilizing various segments
of Indonesian civil society in the post-Suharto transition. Given that
the election occurred in a dramatic political environment, the rising
of Prabowo’s popularity during the election eventually resulted in civil
society entering the political arena and engaging with the political activism during election in many ways. Civil society activists went from
being neutral and focusing on election monitoring, to playing a more
political and partisan role, working on or volunteering for campaigns
to increase the electoral base for Jokowi.
Although the political activism of civil society has been more robust
ever since the 1998 Reformasi, the mobilization of civil society in this
particular election was unprecedented, more diverse, more active, more
political and partisan (Lay 2015). There are at least two differences in
terms of civil society’s political activism in prior to 2014 presidential
election. The first is the concern toward the electoral politics of civil
society actors. Different from previous elections in which the political
activism of civil society focused mainly in the arena of legislative elections (e.g., participating as legislature candidates from a political party
or independent candidates), the 2014 presidential election witnessed a
more partisan and politicized civil society. By these, it means that they
involved in electoral activities not only as electoral base, but also actively
participated as campaign machine for candidate.
The second difference concerns civil society’s interaction with formal politics and political parties. Prior to this election, civil society achttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v4i2.167
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tors developed connection with political parties and transformed their
role from activists to politicians, to endorse many policy reforms and
changes in the parliament (Ichwanuddin 2010; Perdana 2014). In this
case, CSOs and activists used their personal relations and networks to
open dialogue and communication with politicians in the House of
Representative or DPR (Perdana 2015). Cooperation between the two
parties then became a key factor that characterized civil society’s interaction with formal politics. By contrast, civil society’s attitude during
2014 presidential election indicated that albeit being partisan, civil society tended to maintain a considerable distance from political parties.
Instead of endorsing Jokowi’s nomination to political party, civil society
activists established many new volunteer organizations or groups to support Jokowi’s candidacy and took over the parties’ function as campaign
machine during the election (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015, 20).
Within a year, the number of these volunteer groups increased to
hundreds and involved various elements. More than 100 volunteer organizations were founded from 2013 to 2014 and declared their support to
Jokowi as presidential candidate, for example Bara JP, PROJO, Almisbat,
Seknas Jokowi, Duta Jokowi, ARM, Jokowi Mania, Solmet Jokowi, Arus
Bawah Jokowi, Kawan Jokowi, Jasmev, Gerak Indonesia, Kornas Jokowi,
JPKP, GK Center, RPJP, EP for Jokowi, Komunitas Alumni Perguruan
Tinggi, Sekber Jokowi, GRI, RKIH, Kabar Nawacita, and Forkami. According to Gultom, the coordinating secretary of the Tim Koordinasi
Relawan Nasional Jokowi–JK (National Volunteer Coordination Team
for Jokowi–JK), approximately 1,289 volunteer groups were established
throughout Indonesia, comprising an estimated of 1–1.5 million members or sympathizers. This figure is based on the declarations of volunteer status released by the team’s office. Many groups, however, did
not register their members. Thus, the estimate is believed to be only
one third of all the volunteers (Lay 2015, 33). As the establishment of
the volunteer groups was not directed by Jokowi but more by grassroots
participation, they were loosely organized. Thus, creating a list comprising all the members of the volunteer groups is not possible. The most
notable characteristic of the volunteer groups is that they included indiPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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viduals from the lower classes such as housewives, traders at traditional
markets, musicians and youth, as well as businesspeople and political
figures (Suaedy 2015). For example, one prominent volunteer organization, namely Bara JP (Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden), claimed that
its members were from various backgrounds, namely journalists, politicians, actors, artists, lawyers, and students.
For Jokowi, the importance of volunteers was unquestionable to the
point that he acknowledged that without the support of volunteers, it
would have been impossible for him to be nominated by his party
and win the election. Table 1 below presents several volunteer groups
considered to be important and to have leading roles in mobilizing
support, shaping public opinion, and campaigning for Jokowi in the
2014 presidential election.
Table 1
Major Volunteer Groups Supporting Jokowi
Name

Network

Background

BARA JP
(Established
on June 15,
2013)

34 provinces, 67 Activists
countries
from various
backgrounds:
professionals,
journalists, worker
activists, musicians,
etc

SEKNAS
JOKOWI
(Established
on Dec 15,
2013

30 provinces,
267 districts,
2000 members,
several wing
organizations

Civil society and
democracy activists
from various CSOs

PROJO
(Established
on Dec 23,
2014)

34 provinces,
497 regencies/
municipalities

Student activists
from the 1980s,
PDI-P members and
party activists

ALMISBAT
(Established
on April 4,
2014)

40 districts in 7
provinces

Student activists
from the 1998
Reform movement,
PDIP members and
party activists.

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v4i2.167

Reasons for Support Form of Support
• Crisis of trust
toward political
elites
• Aspiring for
political changes
• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate
• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate
• Safeguarding
Indonesian
democracy and
democratic reform
agenda
• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate

• Collect 15 million
signatures on a petition
for the PDI-P to
nominate Jokowi
• Mobilize 500 witnesses
on ballot day

• Organize a national
poster competition
• Formulate agenda and
platforms for Nawacita
campaign
• Design campaign for
youth and women’s
groups
• Influence PDI-P to
nominate Jokowi
• Mobilize 500 witnesses
on ballot day
• Provide campaign
attributes
• Refusal of Prabowo • Design campaign for
and New Order’s
youth groups and
revival
students
• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate
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DUTA JOKOWI 33 provinces
(Established
on June 10,
2014)

1999 student
activists, musicians,
Christian activists
from KWI.

• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate

POSPERA
(Established
on April 30,
2014)

23 provinces,
Student activists
277 regencies/ from the 1998
municipalities,
Reform movement
2000 volunteers

• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate

KAWAN
JOKOWI
(Established
on May 13,
2014)

22 provinces

Activists
from various
backgrounds:
professionals,
musicians, social
activists, etc

• Supporting Jokowi
as a presidential
candidate

ARM
(Established
on March 8,
2014)

Several labor
unions

Labor activists and
networks

• Supporting Jokowi
as presidential
candidate

KMB for
JKW-JK
(Established
on May 28,
2014)
JASMEV 2014
(established
on Aug 12,
2012, reactivated in
2014)

34 provinces,
300 regencies

Business
communities

• Supporting Jokowi
as presidential
candidate

31 regional
Professionals, social
coordinators (in media activists
big cities and
some foreign
countries); 1000
members

• Supporting Jokowi
as presidential
candidate

• Conduct political
canvassing in 100 cities.
• Extend territorial
activities through
networking with various
organizations
• Conduct political
canvassing
• Extend territorial
activities throughout
Indonesia
• Distribute campaign
attributes to voters
• Launch a website to
recruit volunteers
(in cooperation with
Barisan Muda JK)
• Design a campaign for
youth groups through
social media and
YouTube
• Mobilize support from
the working class
• Develop network
with various national
and local worker
organizations
• Mobilize support from
business communities
for Jokowi-Kalla
• Campaign for Jokowi on
social media

Source: Author’s compilation from various sources.

Although the mobilization of volunteer groups can also be found
in Prabowo’s campaign, volunteer groups that supported Jokowi had
distinctive features compared to Prabowo’s volunteers, especially in
terms of size, characteristics, and background. Prabowo’s volunteers
were mostly established by political parties and operated under the
parties’ commands, while Jokowi’s volunteers were mainly established
and loosely coordinated by civil-society activists and comprised various
segments of society: youth, students, activists, musicians, workers, celebrities, and political figures. Furthermore, the scope of Jokowi’s volunteer
networks covered the national and subnational levels, for example, the
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provincial, regency, municipal, and neighborhood levels throughout the
country and were mostly initiated by non-political activists.
In terms of organizational scope, volunteer groups that supported
Jokowi can be categorized into three types. First, organizations operating at the national level became prominent groups. These organizations
were established either by party activists or civil-society activists, had
official branches in many provinces and regions, and maintained a
minimum level of coordination. These organizations created various
methods of campaigning and provided campaign attributes and distributed them to small volunteer groups at the local level. Second, organizations established as branch groups at the provincial, regency, and
municipal levels. Some organizations were established as international
branches and mobilized support from Indonesian citizens living abroad.
Third, local volunteer groups established throughout the country by
local communities, individuals, groups initiatives, and interest groups.
Another notable feature of the volunteer groups that supported
Jokowi is they were established long before the 2014 election. Notably, the presence of volunteer groups that supported Jokowi was flourishing in 2012, when several volunteer groups emerged as extra-party
campaign teams for Joko Widodo–Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly
known as Jokowi–Ahok), who were candidates for gubernatorial positions in Jakarta’s 2012 election. The notable characteristic of these
groups was their heterogeneity in terms of affiliations, backgrounds,
campaign methods, and area of operation. In the 2014 presidential
election, many of these volunteer groups continued to support Jokowi
due to his record of promoting bureaucratic reform in Jakarta. One
volunteer said,
“they had a range of different religious affiliations, ethnicities, social classes, professions, hobbies, origins and education. Some were
from political parties or were friends of party activists who had cast
aside their party identities, while others had no affiliation at all to
political parties, or had initially sympathized with another pair of
candidates before shifting. The volunteers’ areas of operation also
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v4i2.167
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differed, being defined either by geographical territory, segments of
society, or the virtual/ real world. Each group of volunteers was generally formed out of the initiatives of several people, with a number
of others joining later. Their methods also varied; some worked in
a systematic and organized manner within a group of volunteers,
while others worked alone” (Suaedy 2014).
VOLU N T EER S A N D T H E DEMO CR AT IC BU I L DI NG F U NC T ION

Regarding the establishment of volunteer groups, at least three explanations provide insights into the phenomenon of the volunteer groups.
First, the phenomenon can be perceived as a sign of skepticism and
political distrust toward political parties. In this condition, political
parties are considered corrupt entities characterized by patrimonial
politics (Aspinall 2010), neo-authoritarian platforms (Mietzner 2009),
massive corruption, and disconnection with their constituents (Hamid
2012). Consequently, when volunteer groups emerged and assumed a
role to assist the political parties, they became more publicly acceptable.
Although the volunteer groups are outside the party and even tend to
be antiparty, they operate similar to a party in terms of campaigning
and mobilizing support for a candidate. Organizations such as PROJO
served the role of political parties during the campaign and performed
various duties, for example, preparing witnesses in polling stations,
mobilizing support, designing campaigns and advertising, agitating,
and monitoring the voting process (Interview with Budi Ari Setiadi,
September 18, 2016).
Second, the volunteering phenomenon is also considered a struggle
against the oligarchy. Indonesia’s post-transition politics is characterized
by an oligarchic democracy1 (Winters 2013; Ford and Pepinsky 2014).
When Prabowo ran for president in this particular election, many in1 Despite being accredited as the third largest democracy in the world and one of the best
examples of democracy in Southeast Asia, a democratization assessment of Indonesia reveals
serious pitfalls. As Indonesian democracy consolidates, oligarchs are increasingly positioned as
key arbiters of the country’s political life (Winters in Ford and Pepinsky 2014, 3).
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dividuals believed that he represented the oligarchs. Civil society considered him a symbol of old authoritarian Indonesia and volunteers
believed that this particular election was the “final battle” between
the New Order and the Reform Era (Sefsani and Ziegenhain 2015,
22). Hence, many volunteers could have been supporting Jokowi in this
election. An argument was made that the volunteer groups emerged
not only because of the distrust of the parties but also because they
rejected the elite’s behavior, which tended to be formalistic and elitist,
and ignored the will of the people (Aequina 2016). Thus, individuals
opted to form a volunteer group and participate in the election, whether
to monitor the process or to mobilize support for a candidate. Lastly,
the emergence of volunteer groups is related to the electoral politics
of the civil society in the presidential election. Although civil society
activists have opportunities to nominate themselves as candidates in
legislative elections, with or without political parties, the situation was,
of course, different in this election. The capacity of civil society to
nominate their own candidate was limited, if it existed at all, because
no independent candidate ran in this election. Hence, many civil society activists joined volunteer groups as a vehicle and an alternative
channel for their electoral politics and to take advantage of the political
opportunity of that time.
Although these arguments may explain the emergence of volunteer
groups and their role in fulfilling the functions of political parties in
the election, an association between the volunteers’ role and democratic
deepening has not been observed. Thus, careful examination of the
extent to which the emergence and role of volunteers in the election
contributed to the development of a robust civil society and to the democratic deepening in Indonesia is needed and assessment of whether
their support of Jokowi for president was based on the democratic reform agenda is also necessary to clarify the assumptions of civil society
as an engine for democratization. At one point, this article agrees that
the role of volunteers is indeed significant and undoubtedly a factor
behind Jokowi’s victory in the 2014 presidential election. In addition,
the article accredits the importance of “traditional” civic organizations
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v4i2.167
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as a watchdog for the election to ensure that the process and results are
credible. During the election, civic organizations and individuals were
actively involved in monitoring, observing, and checking the outcomes
of the election and inviting public participation in the recapitulation of
the votes. Arguably, such initiatives are critical because they prevented
irregularities in that election and will prevent irregularities in future
elections. According to Lanćee (2014), such initiatives have marked civil
society’s agenda in support of electoral integrity and are significance
to make it legitimate, open to scrutiny, and apt to change that could
promote fairer proceedings and increased levels of trust among the
electorate.
With regard to the role of volunteers, Sefsani and Ziegenhain (2015)
argued that Jokowi’s volunteers used three predominant means to contribute to the deepening of democracy in Indonesia: “By being active
and undertaking the election campaign activities mentioned previously,
the voluntary groups fulfilled various functions of a civil society, which
Diamond has identified as being supportive of democracy. By spreading
information about Joko Widodo’s democratic reform agenda, volunteer
groups disseminated democratic ideas and values. By being autonomous
and voluntary, the volunteer organizations set an example, advocating
a change from electoral support as a form of clientelism to self-directed
and participatory citizenship. The activities of the relawan organizations
were an example of active involvement in politics by normal citizens and
empowered many individuals who had not taken an active interest in
politics in the past, and thus stimulated political participation” (Sefsani
and Ziegenhain 2015, 30).
For many volunteers, supporting Jokowi over Prabowo meant fighting for improvements in Indonesian democracy. By choosing the populist version of Jokowi over the populist version of Prabowo, civic groups’
expectations were high, that is, a Jokowi presidency would be marked by
transparency, accountability, rule of law, and respect for human rights
(Vaughn 2014). Such high expectations had been expressed widely by
various elements of civil society, including individuals participating in
voluntary actions to campaign on his behalf. Through social media,
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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people expressed their approval for Jokowi freely, using the ribbon “I
Stand on the Right Side” next to their avatars on Facebook and Twitter,
implying that the best choice was to support Jokowi. Compared with
the enormous support that Jokowi received in the election, Prabowo
received a considerably strong rejection from many prodemocracy elements. Civic groups and national media coverage seemed to favor
Jokowi over Prabowo. Notably, The Jakarta Post, in an unprecedented
and bold move, expressed its rejection of Prabowo explicitly and endorsed Jokowi in an editorial column, “Endorsing Jokowi” (the Jakarta
Post, July 4, 2014).
In the opinion of Jokowi’s supporters, stand up for Jokowi was interpreted as support for strengthened democratization in the country
and “a battle” to safeguard the future of Indonesian democracy. At
this point, civil society is considered being partisan in this election as
a mean to ensure the advancement of the democratic agenda under
Jokowi’s administration—if he won. However, this article asserts that the
discussion of civil society should investigate that its establishment and
role as agents of democratization may be hindered by the complexities
within civil society itself; thus, an investigation of the case of volunteers
from this perspective is worthwhile. A realistic assessment on the role
of the volunteer groups that supported Jokowi reveals volunteers remain
constrained by their capacity to strengthen democracy. Although the
role of the volunteers have fulfilled some of the democratic-building
functions, an examination of whether such functions were run only by
volunteers during the election is necessary. The success of volunteers in
endorsing Jokowi’s candidacy to the political parties and fulfilling their
function as Jokowi’s campaigners is not necessarily associated with the
democratic-building function as Diamond advocates. Instead, volunteers are functioned as an “extra political party” in Jokowi’s campaign.
Civil society in its ideal form is more likely to contribute to the
democratic process if it maintains its fundamental role to empower
people and serves as the counterbalance power and as the watchdog
of the election. In the context of the 2014 presidential election, these
roles were played mostly by the so-called traditional civic organizations.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
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These organizations gathered and produced collective actions to ensure
the integrity of the election and were directly engaged in canvassing
and interacting with voters to generate opportunities for public participation in the election process and result. Support for candidates in this
context must be considered as personal preference, with the democratic
reform agenda being a secondary priority. However, this condition was
not the case for volunteer groups that supported Jokowi; their establishment and motivations were more complex, and some groups were
created solely to win Jokowi’s campaign, not to pursue further democratic agenda. Furthermore, some groups were even created to seek
political and economic interests of their members, while some operated
like political parties. Hence, relating the role of the volunteers to the
democratic deepening process in Indonesia might be presumptive and
oversimplified.
T H E COM PL E X NAT U R E OF VOLU N T EER
GROU P S SU PP ORT I NG JOKOW I

Although the aforementioned arguments support the vital role of
civil society—and volunteers in particular—during the election, these
claims have not investigated the possibility that these volunteer groups
may have had undemocratic goals. Notably, regarding this point, Suryajaya (2014) asserted that volunteer groups that supported Jokowi also
consisted of individuals with an interest in advancing their political
goals and that a distinction must be made among the volunteers based
on their motivation prior to and after the election (Table 2).
Table 2
Type of Volunteer Groups Supporting Jokowi
Motivation

Type of
Volunteers
Supporting Jokowi as a Anti-Prabowo
refusal of Prabowo
Volunteers
Supporting Jokowi due Volunteers
to his personality
Type A
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Political Position in the Assessments
Post-Election
Critical to Jokowi’s
• Realistic expectation toward
administration
Jokowi’s administration
• Maintain critical position toward
Jokowi’s governance
Supporting Jokowi for • Militant supporters, whose
personal reason
militancy relied on Jokowi’s
figure
• Key factor for Jokowi’s victory

15

Jurnal Politik, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 15

252

JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 4, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2019

Supporting Jokowi due Volunteers
to his programs
Type B

Supporting Jokowi for
political opportunity
and career

Oligarchs

Critical supports based • Solid support towards Jokowi
on programmatic
despite negative opinion or
issues
Jokowi’s personality.
• Attracted to Jokowi because of
his programmatic issues
• Key factor for Jokowi’s victory
• Aims for political positions for
Concession and
project-based support
personal interest and forced
Jokowi to engage in “horse
trading” politics and abandon
some of his programmatic
agenda.

Source: sorted data from Suryajaya 2014.

After the election, one of the most upsetting occurrences was the
influx of volunteer figures to state-owned enterprises (known as Badan
Usaha Milik Negara, BUMN). While this tradition has been upheld
by previous presidents as a means of providing political compensation,
Jokowi’s administration was no exception to this tradition despite his
pledge to run an open government free of collusion and free of horsetrading politics. Not long after his inauguration as the president of Indonesia, Jokowi appointed a considerable number of figures from the
volunteer groups to political offices in state institutions or as commissioners in various BUMN. As admitted by Adian Napitulu, a Pospera
leader, many of Pospera members were appointed as commissioners in
BUMN, mostly at PTPN (PT Perkebunan Nusantara) located in many
provinces (Sumandoyo 2016). Similarly, PROJO officials reported that
many PROJO figures were appointed as commissioners in various SOEs
and were involved in facilitating the implementation of government
programs in various regions.
Thus, coming to the following conclusion was not difficult. The
employment of volunteers, politicians, and success teams was used as
compensation for their support in helping Jokowi win the election.
In Indonesian political tradition, commissioner positions in SOEs are
typically considered a reward from the government-elect to individuals who have connections to the government and were involved in the
political process prior to the election. Hence, supporting Jokowi with
the expectation of political reward is not unusual for volunteer groups,
despite their initial support for Jokowi to achieve democratic goals. The
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
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salary of a commissioner ranges from IDR 10 to 120 million, depending on company’s revenue; thus, unsurprisingly, many volunteers were
interested in becoming commissioners. Notably, many volunteers applied to become a commissioner through Rumah Transisi, an ad hoc
team led by Rini Soemarno (later the Minister of SOEs) that prepared
a blueprint for Jokowi’s administration.
From the volunteers’ perspective, being a commissioner and participating in the government is part of their responsibility to safeguard
Jokowi’s administration, to advocate policy changes within the government, and to ensure that the victory is maintained after the election.
As argued by PROJO officials, President Jokowi’s policy of granting
offices concurred with precedent considering the significant role of
PROJO in endorsing Jokowi’s candidacy and supporting his campaign:
“Some of PROJO’s members were assigned several SOEs to safeguard
the implementation of the Nawacita program of Jokowi–JK” (Interview,
September 12, 2016). Correspondingly, Budi Ari Setiadi, Chairman of
PROJO, also stated: “By contrast, if we weren’t involved [in the government] that would be odd. Although in my case, I don’t have motivation to
be commissioner, I support my fellow volunteers who fulfill that position.
Who else then? We don’t have to deny that volunteers are allowed to help
[Jokowi] after election. In my opinion, the more volunteers [that become
commissioners] there are, the better.”
Similar arguments from the volunteers can also be found in their
statements reported in the mass media, namely, the sharp criticism
from the public and the opposing opinions of volunteers regarding such
behavior (Alvionitasari & Sugiharto 2016). Amid the rising criticism of
volunteers’ influx in SOEs, President Jokowi stated, “Everything is in accordance with the selection mechanism, and the government aims to make
SOEs a driving force for economy and infrastructure” (Supratiwi 2015).
However, Vice President Jusuf Kalla was more frank in responding to
the critics. He said that the appointment of volunteers as commissioners
by the President was part of the political tradition in Indonesian politics,
that is, a new precedent had not been set (Pratomo 2015). According
to Suaedy, the involvement of volunteers within the political system
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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following Jokowi’s victory was a consequence of a partisan social movement; to take charge of the postelection political agenda, they had to
be included in the government. Being involved and placed in strategic
positions would make it easier for the volunteers to endorse substantial
changes within policies without undermining democratic procedures
(Suaedy 2016). As argued by Farid, founder of Seknas Jokowi, Jokowi’s
victory in the presidential election opened a space for volunteers to be
directly involved from within and being a policy maker is more effective than being a watchdog for the government (Interview with KSI,
March 31, 2017).
Arguably, this opportunistic behavior of volunteers confirms the
problematic nature of the volunteer groups that supported Jokowi for
president. First, it only nurtures, if not worsens, the tradition of “horsetrading politics” in Indonesia. Although Jokowi promised his presidency
would end transactional politics, the opposite has been observed. The
formation of a “cabinet of compromise” and the distribution of important positions among the volunteers and other supporters of his campaign was clearly the result of a horse-trading brand of politics. Second,
this opportunistic behavior of volunteers refutes the argument that the
volunteer groups that supported Jokowi had prodemocratic goals. Instead of safeguarding Jokowi’s administration from the party oligarchs
who attempt to paralyze and tame his power, these volunteers emerged
as another group of oligarchs seeking power and wealth. Notably, the
politics of volunteers during the election was epitomized in an online
media special report called “Gurita Timses di BUMN”—Leviathans in
State-Owned Companies (Sumandoyo 2016).
L I M I T S OF T H E VOLU N T EER S ’
DEMO CR AC Y- BU I L DI NG F U NC T IONS

Although this article agrees that volunteers are instrumental in
encouraging political participation, the extent of their role in fulfilling democratic functions was aimed particularly at gaining votes and
winning the presidency for Jokowi. The partisanship of the volunteers
has constrained their ability to fulfill the democratic functions of a
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
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progressive civil society. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, not all volunteer organizations promoted democratic reform or further democratic
agenda. Many were established solely to win Jokowi’s campaign. In
this context, a comparison of the volunteers’ agenda and “traditional”
CSOs’ agenda would be worthwhile.2 Compared to the extraordinary
(and unprecedented) involvement of traditional CSOs in organizing
collective action, monitoring the election and generating opportunities for public participation, the seemingly active and robust volunteer
groups that played a pivotal role in the 2014 presidential election do
not reflect a strong, robust civil society, which Putnam and Diamond
have argued is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation.
Unlike the party oligarchs, volunteer groups that supported Jokowi
were not a solid entity, that is, these groups were loosely organized, allied, involved many elements, and were considerably fragmented. The
only factor that unified civil society (and volunteer groups) during the
2014 presidential election was Prabowo’s candidacy. The presidential
campaigns of Jokowi and Prabowo provided space for civil society to
participate and use collective action to take a leading role in the election: to monitor the election or support Jokowi’s candidacy. However,
the situation changed after the election. Depending on their motivation,
Jokowi’s supporters may have had different attitudes toward Jokowi’s
administration: some might return to political apathy (Savirani 2015),
some would return to critiquing civil society, and some others who
gained “rewards” would be most likely to continue supporting Jokowi.
In addition, not all volunteer organizations supported democratic
reform agenda. One reason for this phenomenon is because some volunteer groups were created simply to support Jokowi’s campaign and
helped him win the election. Consequently, most of these organizations dissolved after the election, except for PROJO and Pospera, which
transformed into mass organization (known as ormas). The fact that the
volunteer groups supporting Jokowi also consisted of “career-seekers”
and “opportunists” has provided evidence to the argument in this paper.
2 In this paper, “traditional” refers to established CSOs working on various topics, including
anticorruption, an election watch, the environment, human rights, and democracy.
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In this context, the nature of voluntary groups, that is dynamic and
loosely organized, will have negative impact if misused by individuals
with political motives (DEMOS 2015), as is the case for the volunteers
who expect “rewards” in return for their support.
Limited by a seemingly narrow agenda, the role of volunteers is thus
only instrumental in helping Jokowi with the election and far from contributing to the deepening of Indonesian democracy after the election—
as has been argued in the literature. Notably, political volunteerism has
successfully become a new phenomenon in Indonesian politics; thus, a
more substantial discussion of the role of volunteers during elections is
necessary. As one study argued, the function of volunteers should not
be limited to supporting a candidate alone; instead, volunteers should
feel morally obliged to participate in creating the new administration’s
agenda to ensure that the promises made by the candidate to the electorate during the campaign period are implemented (Suryajaya 2014). In
other words, to provide substantive meaning to the phenomenon of political volunteerism, the electoral politics of civil society must be based
on programmatic issues; only by doing this can volunteers and civil
society contribute to the democratic deepening in Indonesia. Constructing electoral support on the basis of programmatic issues will also help
to ensure that civil society is fulfilling its democracy-building function.
Hence, the question remains: can volunteers function as civil society
if they do not distance themselves from the government? Considering the findings of this investigation into how most of the volunteers
positioned themselves after the election, such expectations may be too
hollow. Even an organization such as PROJO positioned its organization as a “die-hard” supporter of Jokowi’s administration, despite their
transformation into an ormas after the election.
Instead of fulfilling civil society’s democracy-building functions,
most volunteers were likely functioning as an arm of Jokowi’s election campaign: providing an electoral base, mobilizing support from
voters, and campaigning for Jokowi. After the election, the volunteers
supported Jokowi’s government and acted to safeguard Jokowi’s government through their involvement within it. This position, in the end, will
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/15
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hamper their role in functioning as an independent civil society if they
remain inside the government. That said, disconnection was observed
between the seemingly democratic role of the volunteers during and
after the presidential election. Although the role of volunteers increased
the integrity of the election and the democratic process throughout the
election, the problematic nature of the volunteer groups that supported
Jokowi hindered the function of civil society after the election. The
appointment of volunteer activists as commissioners, for instance, has
resulted in skepticism and prejudice regarding the real motives behind
the establishment of the volunteer groups and their reasons to support
Jokowi in this election. Thus, most of the traditional organizations not
clearly stating their support for Jokowi’s bid for the presidency and focusing on preventing election irregularities by actively monitoring the
process and the result makes sense. Although some members of traditional organizations joined volunteer groups, little effect, if any, was
observed regarding the independence of the organizations.
Thus, a more in-depth investigation into civil society’s support for
Jokowi during his campaign for president, which was presumed to be
morally appropriate, should be reconsidered. Although the support of
civil society was the foremost factor in Jokowi winning the presidential
election, his candidacy was also possible because of his party supporters.
By contrast, civil society’s capacity to transform politics through being
the impetus that won Jokowi the election may not have succeeded in
influencing his actions after the election. Despite the ability of civil
society (in the form of volunteer organizations) to mobilize public support during the election and become a so-called hero of democracy, this
capacity is of limited relevance to the democratization of Indonesia. In
line with the democratic consolidation agenda, civil society’s capacity
to challenge oligarchic influence after the election was also restricted.
CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that volunteers played an instrumental
role in the democratic process in the 2014 presidential election. Their
contribution to making the election a success and putting a popular
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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candidate into power has resulted in new hope for a flourishing, progressive civil society. To some extent, volunteers contributed to the improvement of the democratic process in the election: they stimulated
citizens’ political participation to legitimize the election and ensure
that no irregularities occurred.
However, the discussion of volunteers in connection with democratic-building functions required consideration because volunteers are
constrained by the problematic nature of volunteerism. Driven by the
objective to elect Jokowi as president, volunteers were significant as
campaigners and as a substitute for the function of political parties,
but were irrelevant after the election. After the election, the presumably democratic volunteers did not manifest the expectation of being
democratic champions, and instead, became rogues who exhibited opportunistic political behavior. In the end, the complex nature of volunteers impedes their capacity to advance the democratic agenda under
Jokowi’s administration.
In light of the seemingly progressive nature of civil society, the case
of volunteerism in the 2014 presidential election provides little evidence
to support the many assumptions linking vibrant, flourishing volunteer
groups to the democratic functions of civil society. The case of political volunteerism in Indonesia, instead, demonstrates that the volunteer
phenomenon is more related to the dysfunctional political parties, and
that volunteers are instrumental in fulfilling various functions of political parties during the election. Although the success of volunteers
as campaigners has inspired similar movements in local elections in
Indonesia, this article suggests that it remains too early to attribute
the embodiment of a progressive civil society in line with democraticbuilding functions to volunteerism.
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